Donald Trump’s plans for Venezuela, or rather the lack of them

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At least he didn’t call it a “special military operation.”

The lightning-strike seizure of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by American special forces was tactically brilliant, but U.S. President Donald Trump’s Venezuelan strategy appears to be thin to non-existent. His Saturday press conference was triumphant in tone and incoherent in substance. Things have become even less clear since.

Mr. Trump boasted a lot about American power. He claimed the United States would “run” Venezuela – though it has no troops on the ground. And he waxed on about Venezuelan oil, the opportunities for preferred American companies and how profits would pay the U.S. in “reimbursement for the damages caused us by that country.”

Barely mentioned were the human rights of Venezuelans – which are the only plausible justification for military action.

Mr. Trump even rejected María Corina Machado, the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize winner, absurdly claiming that the leader of the party that won Venezuela’s stolen 2024 election “doesn’t have the support within or the respect within the country.”

At least he didn’t call her a "dictator without elections."

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Instead, Mr. Trump tapped Delcy Rodríguez – the vice-president of the regime he had supposedly overthrown – as his preferred leader, with whom he insinuated he had reached some kind of deal. She and her government responded with statements to the contrary.

As Donald Rumsfeld once said, there are known knowns, known unknowns and unknown unknowns. Almost everything about the White House’s plans for Venezuela fall into the latter two categories.

The impression left is that this is a political marketing operation for a domestic audience. Real-world outcomes? Secondary considerations.

It will all be confusing and disappointing to Venezuelans – a strong majority of whom are believed to have voted against Mr. Maduro, and for Ms. Machado’s party, in rigged 2024 elections.

They’ve been waiting a long time for liberation. Mr. Trump is apparently uninterested in such an outcome.

Opinion: Change – but not regime change – comes to Venezuela

The Venezuelan economy shrank by more than 80 per cent between 2012 and 2020, inflation exploded and the regime became increasingly repressive, driving millions to emigrate.

Venezuela used to be one of the wealthiest countries in Latin America, with its wealth based on oil. The country was marked by corruption and mismanagement, but in the late 1990s it pumped in excess of three million barrels a day of oil – more than Canada at the time.

Hugo Chávez came to power in 1999, nationalized the industry, drained it of investment and expertise, and set it on a path of decline. It began in the 2000s, picked up speed in the 2010s and was further accelerated by sanctions against Mr. Chávez’s successor, Mr. Maduro.

Venezuela has among the world’s largest oil reserves, but in 2025, oil production was just one million barrels a day. Canada, which once produced a fraction of Venezuela’s output, pumps about six times as much.

With a return to legitimate government, democracy, the rule of law and some level of managerial competency – Ms. Machado has degrees in engineering and finance – Venezuela would have a shot at attracting foreign investment, rebuilding its oil industry and injecting money into its moribund economy.

What the U.S. attack on Venezuela could mean for oil and Canadian crude exports

A little back-of-the-envelope math: If oil production rose by one million barrels a day, at a price of US$50, that would represent more than US$18-billion a year in revenue, much of it flowing to the Venezuelan government in royalties.

But that can’t come to pass without the right institutions, and it can’t happen overnight. It would take years, and maybe decades.

Canadian oil production has more than doubled since 2000 – but it took a quarter-century, and tens of billions of dollars in investment. Or consider Iraq. It pumped 2.5 million barrels of oil a day in 2000, an amount that cratered after sanctions and the U.S. invasion. It took years to climb back to its preinvasion level. However, Iraqi production is now more than four million barrels a day.

In the short run, Venezuelan oil exports could fall, if the U.S. maintains the blockade. The impact on global markets would not likely be significant, because Venezuela is such a small producer.

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However, if sanctions are lifted, and if foreign investment and exiled oil experts return to the country, production and exports would rise. That could be a negative for Canada’s oil industry, for a couple of reasons.

First, investment capital is finite. Money going into building and refurbishing oil facilities in Venezuela isn’t coming here. And Canada is very much trying to entice more oil investment.

Second, most of Alberta’s oil is similar to Venezuelan crude. Both are heavy oils. Refineries on the U.S. Gulf Coast were designed to process it, but sanctions mostly cut them off from what used to be their closest source.

The return of Venezuela to global oil and investment markets, and a ramping up of Venezuelan production, would provide further encouragement for Canada to pursue one or more new pipelines to tidewater – to get the best price for our oil by making more of it available to customers beyond the U.S.

All of this, however, rests on the assumption that Mr. Trump is priming Venezuela for a better future. A very big assumption.

Editor’s note: This article has been updated to correct the paraphrase of Donald Rumsfeld, who once said, there are known knowns, known unknowns and unknown unknowns.