Prime Minister Mark Carney holds up a model submarine as he tours Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) in Kiel, Germany in August, 2025.Christinne Muschi/The Canadian Press
Jeffrey F. Collins is an associate professor of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island. He is the author of the 2024 book, Canada’s Defence Procurement Woes.
That Canada needs a new fleet of submarines to replace its four surplus British lemons is clear.
This country has the world’s longest coastline and asserts unrecognized claims over Arctic waters, now one of the world’s most contested regions. The ability to have the military equivalent of underwater eyes and ears is therefore no longer a luxury. It is a sovereign necessity.
But in getting new submarines, the Carney government will have to perform a delicate balancing act between learning from procurement mistakes, pivoting to new supply chains for non-traditional naval suppliers, and meeting North American alliance commitments. No easy feat.
Considering that it took the army 21 years to get new transport trucks, the more technically sophisticated Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) is moving at lightning speed.
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Formally stood up in summer 2021, the request for information from interested bidders dropped in September, 2024. In August, 2025, two companies were deemed to have met the navy’s requirements for a stealthy and Arctic deployable diesel-electric powered fleet: South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean Co. Ltd. and Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems.
A contract award is expected some time this year with the first new sub in the water by 2035, just as the existing maintenance-prone Victoria class submarines begin decommissioning. Both companies say this target can be met but if there is any slippage, the navy risks managing a costly and dangerous capability gap.
When the navy’s 1970s-vintage Protecteur class refuelling ships rusted and burned out in 2015-16, before their replacements were ready, Ottawa turned to leasing a converted container ship and buying access to Chilean and Spanish refuelling ships to avoid losing the refuelling capability altogether. Those replacements are still not expected to be fully operational until 2028 and unlike the 1990s, when the Victoria class boats were acquired, there is no used-submarine dealer available.
And if schedule is king, changing the procurement machinery will require deft handling. A new defence procurement entity, the Defence Investment Agency, was created last October. It is expected to get its own legislation this spring and is handling the CPSP among its initial tranche of major capital projects.
Prime Minister Mark Carney climbs down a ladder into a submarine during a tour of the Hanwha Ocean Shipyard in Geoje Island, South Korea, in October, 2025.Adrian Wyld/The Canadian Press
There are many good reasons for moving to a stand-alone model (concentrating expertise for example), but staffing up a new bureaucratic machine is never easy in the best of times. It will require focused and deliberate development to minimize delays as new people are hired, processes are ironed out, and an organizational culture takes shape.
The agency will also be entrusted with executing several big planks in the Defence Industrial Strategy, launched late last month. The strategy, a Canadian first since the Korean War, commits, among other things, to partnering with “trusted” allies when Canada lacks the means to build domestically.
Whether Ottawa opts for South Korean or German subs, it will be a symbolic and operationally significant break for a country that has always relied on either British or American submarines since the 1960s (who now use solely nuclear-powered submarines). Should all dozen subs be acquired over the 2030s and ’40s, then close to half of Canada’s future naval combat power will be connected to either Seoul or Berlin for decades to come.
Yet there are limits to this deviation. History and geography matter. Prior submarine purchases reflected, in part, Canada’s Cold War duties to work primarily alongside the Americans in training, detecting, deterring and if necessary, defeating Soviet submarines in the north Atlantic.
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Then, there was the human element: familiarity in customs, language, training and joint service beginning with allied naval battles of the Second World War, and forged through generations of global service, off Korea, the Persian Gulf and the Caribbean.
To enable interoperability with their American counterparts, Canadian submarines and surface ships have long been equipped with sophisticated Pentagon technology, like torpedoes and combat-management systems. The fifteen River Class destroyers now under construction in Halifax are similarly to be equipped with U.S.-made sensors, missiles, electric motors and radar. The replacement for the CP-140 maritime patrol aircraft (itself an American product) is Boeing’s P-8A Poseidon.
Canada’s future submarine fleet will need to share secure sensor and communication data with U.S. counterparts to meet pre-existing maritime warning responsibilities under the binational North American Aerospace Defence command.
That the Trump administration specifically singled out Canada in its recent National Defence Strategy to fulfill a “vital role” in defending the continent against undersea threats reiterates how critical our southern neighbour sees this as part of our joint defence commitments.
In seeking a non-traditional submarine supplier, Canada cannot completely separate itself from 80 years of the joint defence of the continent.