U.S. President Donald Trump greets Mohammed bin Salman, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on the South Lawn of the White House last November.SAUL LOEB/AFP/Getty Images
Alex MacDonald has previously held positions in the United Nations, Government of Alberta, on Parliament Hill in Ottawa and in industry. He now works for Counsel Public Affairs, which has clients in the nuclear sector.
The recently announced nuclear deal between Saudi Arabia and the United States marks a substantive change of course in U.S. nuclear energy and non-proliferation policy, threatening the nascent nuclear energy renaissance.
Announced late last week, the U.S. and Saudi Arabian governments reached a deal in principle on civil nuclear co-operation. It will allow for the transfer and sale of American nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia in the interest of establishing a civil nuclear program.
On the surface, the deal looks similar to an agreement the U.S. signed with the United Arab Emirates in 2009. But there are some key differences that present substantial risk.
Whereas the UAE deal required that country to forego the ability to domestically enrich or reprocess uranium, while also submitting to full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency verification and safeguards, the Saudi deal does not have any similar limitations or conditions.
After the deal was announced, some U.S. officials attempted to clarify that the Saudi deal will include “bespoke” safeguard measures, and that uranium enrichment is not “envisioned.” Though, what is clear based on initial reporting of the deal’s contents is the Saudis will not face the same “gold standard” provisions that were required of the UAE.
It is not uncommon for incumbent nuclear nations to co-operate with nuclear hopeful countries – this is the regular order of affairs. Both Canada and the U.S. have helped several non-nuclear states to begin civilian nuclear energy programs through technology transfers and the sharing of regulatory expertise.
For decades, however, the best practice has been for the incumbent nations to require stringent observations of non-proliferation norms. This is achieved by strong conditions being placed on the transfer of technology, including that there should be no retransfers, no reprocessing of imported nuclear materials and no enrichment of uranium to weapons-grade levels. Rules have also required co-ordination and verification of peaceful use with the IAEA through an “additional protocol.”
In Canada, this is achieved and governed by Nuclear Co-operation Agreements, and in the U.S. by 123 Agreements. In both instances, the practices have historically been grounded in the international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and certified by the IAEA.
These arrangements have allowed for expanded access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the benefit of people across the globe – access to clean, reliable base-load power, life-saving medical treatments and innovative research.
The U.S.-Saudi deal threatens decades of precedents and risks harming the nuclear renaissance we are entering. The expansion of civilian nuclear programs is conditional on reducing and restricting the military use of nuclear technology.
The most vocal anti-nuclear activists focus their critiques on concerns over the existential threat from nuclear weapons and the radioactive waste from nuclear operations. To mitigate both risks, they say uranium should be left in the ground, rather than harnessed for clean power. The best antidote to these claims are strong safeguards and stewardship of the safe, non-military use of nuclear energy.
Moreover, a double standard is emerging in U.S. foreign policy on nuclear weapons. The U.S. has now on multiple occasions militarily engaged Iran while either fully or partly using the country’s escalating nuclear capabilities as its justification.
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What does this all mean for Canada?
As the U.S. walks away from its “gold standard” of nuclear co-operation, Canada’s moral responsibility to support the export of safe and secure nuclear power options only becomes more important.
As the first non-proliferator (being the first nation with nuclear-weapons capability to refrain from their development), Canada can continue to uphold and reinforce the norms of non-proliferation, while supporting the non-military expansion of nuclear energy at home and for export.
As a Tier One nuclear state without a weapons program, we should demonstrate to the world the true “gold standard” of a peaceful nuclear fuel cycle. From cradle to grave, uranium should be harvested responsibly and used sustainably across all reactor types, and uranium enrichment and reprocessing should be safely and peacefully harnessed with full safeguards to further energy abundance and independence.
There is an emerging void of international leadership. As a nuclear energy superpower and committed non-proliferator, Canada can and should lead when others stray.