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CLEAR IN THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S SPEECH AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY LAST YEAR. IMPORTANT THAT PRIORITY SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE GIVEN TO THE REDUCTION OF SUPERPOWER ARSENALS.

(D) MBFR. WE REGRET TRUDEAU'S SUGGESTION (EAST BERLIN TELNO 37) THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS MIGHT ATTEND THE FIRST SESSION OF THE RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS A MATTER ON WHICH THE ALLIES SHOULD REACH AN AGREED POSITION BEFORE SUGGESTIONS ARE PUT TO THE OTHER SIDE, AS INDEED IS THE CASE FOR THE SUBSTANCE OF NATO POLICY ON MBFR. TRUDEAU'S STATEMENT IN EAST BERLIN SEEMS TO PRE-EMPT THE OUTCOME OF THE REVIEW COMMISSIONED BY MINISTERS ON 8/9 DECEMBER.

(E) CHEMICAL WEAPONS. TRUDEAU'S SUGGESTION (EAST BERLIN TELNO 037) THAT A BAN COVERING THE EUROPEAN THEATRE MIGHT BE A PRACTICABLE FIRST STEP IS PARTICULARLY REGRETTABLE COMING AT A TIME WHEN THE ALLIES ARE EMPHASISING THE NEED FOR A WORLDWIDE BAN WITH STRINGENT VERIFICATION. IT IS IMPORTANT TO INSIST ON THIS BOTH BECAUSE OF THE EXISTING EVIDENCE OF USE IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD AND BECAUSE THE WEAPONS COULD EASILY BE TRANSPORTED BACK TO EUROPE.

(F) NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. REGRETTABLE THAT TRUDEAU SHOULD REFER TO THE ABSURDITY (BUCHAREST TELNO 25) OF A DETERRENT WHICH HAS HELPED TO PRESERVE PEACE IN EUROPE FOR 39 YEARS. NO ONE PRETENDS THAT IT IS THE FINAL WORD BUT NOTHING MORE EFFECTIVE HAS YET BEEN PUT FORWARD.

(G) PARTICULARLY REGRETTABLE THAT TRUDEAU SHOULD QUESTION PUBLICLY THE US COMMITMENT TO PROTECT ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES (OTTAWA TELNO 65) - A COMMITMENT UNDERLINED BY THE PRESENCE OF 300,000 AMERICANS IN EUROPE AND REINFORCED BY THE DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES.

(H) WE ARE CONCERNED AT TRUDEAU'S TENDENCY TO LUMP BOTH SUPERPOWERS TOGETHER AND SEEK COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE NON-SUPERPOWER MEMBERS OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. AT THE VERY LEAST THIS IMPLIES EQUAL RESPONSIBILITY BY THE US AND USSR FOR THE CURRENT STATE OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS MORE GENERALLY. IT IS FUNDAMENTAL TO ALLIANCE COHESION THAT POSITIONS ON ARMS CONTROL AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS

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CONTINUE TO BE DEVELOPED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND THAT INDIVIDUAL ALLIES SHOULD RESIST CUTTING ACROSS THE WORK BEING DONE ON EG MBFR, CDE AND THE EAST/WEST APPRAISAL BY TAKING BILATERAL INITIATIVES WITH MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT (WHETHER GREECE WITH ROMANIA OR CANADA WITH THE GDR).

3. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHERE THE CANADIAN BRIEFING ON TRUDEAU'S TOUR WILL TAKE PLACE. IF IT IS IN OTTAWA, WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF LORD MORAN WOULD ALSO TAKE ACTION THERE DRAWING ON PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE. IF IT IS IN BRUSSELS, WE WOULD STILL SEE ADVANTAGE IN LORD MORAN TAKING FOLLOW UP ACTION WITH THE DEA ON RECEIPT OF A REPORTING TELEGRAM FROM SIR J GRAHAM. WE AGREE THAT WE SHOULD NOT GET OUT IN FRONT ON THIS AND THAT ANY ACTION IN OTTAWA SHOULD BE IN PARALLEL WITH OUR MAJOR ALLIES.

4. IN RESPONSE TO ANY PRESS QUERIES (OTTAWA TELNO 71) WE SHALL BE TAKING THE LINE THAT WE SHARE TRUDEAU'S DESIRE FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL. BUT WE SEE DIFFICULTIES WITH SOME OF THE SPECIFIC IDEAS AND PROPOSALS HE IS PUTTING FORWARD. WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ILLUSTRATE THE POINT AS APPROPRIATE BY DRAWING ON (C), (E), (F) AND (G) IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE.

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NAD
ACDD
SOVIET DEPT
EED
WED
NEWS DEPT
INFORMATION DEPT

X

PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR W HARDING
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR D THOMAS
MR JENKINS

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OO UKDEL NATO

Amc 021/3.	
NO. 72	
31 JAN 1984	
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MA 31/1

GRS 429

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FM FCO 301640Z JAN 84

TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 41 OF 30 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY OTTAWA, UKDIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON
 INFO ROUTINE (DS17) MOD, PARIS, BONN, ROME, ANKARA, ATHENS,
 BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, OSLO,
 MADRID, CANBERRA, TOKYO, UKDEL VIENNA
 INFO SAVING REYKJAVIK

18

YOUR TELNO 58: CANADIAN PROPOSALS FOR THE CDE
 1. WE AGREE THAT YOU SHOULD TAKE A FIRM LINE, AS SUGGESTED, ON

THIS CANADIAN MOVE. YOU MIGHT ENCOURAGE OTHER ALLIES,
 PARTICULARLY THE AMERICANS, TO DO LIKEWISE. IT IS UNLIKELY,
 GIVEN TRUDEAU'S PERSONAL INTEREST, THAT THE CANADIANS CAN BE
 RIDDEN OFF AT THIS STAGE BUT YOU SHOULD AT LEAST GO THROUGH THE
 MOTIONS OF ASKING THEM NOT TO TABLE. IT WOULD BE WRONG FOR
 THE ALLIANCE TO ALLOW THEM TO THINK THAT IT IS NOT A MATTER FOR
 SERIOUS OBJECTION TO TABLE CONTROVERSIAL PROPOSALS ON SENSITIVE
 ISSUES WITHOUT MORE THAN A NOD IN THE DIRECTION OF CONSULTATION.
 NOT TO MAKE THIS POINT FIRMLY WOULD SET A BAD PRECEDENT WHICH
 MIGHT BE EXPLOITED BY OTHER POTENTIAL WAVERERS IN THE ALLIANCE
 WITH DOMESTIC POLITICAL INTERESTS IN STRIKING PUBLIC ATTITUDES
 IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD.

2. IN ADDITION TO THE POINTS YOU SUGGEST YOU COULD ADD THE
 FOLLOWING ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSALS:

(A) ASAT BAN. AS THE CANADIANS WILL BE AWARE, THE UK ATTACHES
 IMPORTANCE TO THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE. AT
 THE END OF THE LAST SESSION OF THE CD IN 1983, WE WERE PREPARED
 TO SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WORKING GROUP TO REVIEW
 EXISTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN THIS DOMAIN. WE CONTINUE
 TO BELIEVE THAT FOR THE MOMENT THIS IS THE BEST WAY TO PURSUE
 A SUBJECT OF REAL SECURITY INTEREST TO THE WEST. IT IS TO BE
 FEARED THAT THE USSR WILL EXPLOIT THE CANADIAN PAPER TO ADVOCATE

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THE LAUNCHING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THEIR DRAFT TREATY
(B) THE SECOND PROPOSAL IS FOR A RADICAL CHANGE IN THE APPROACH
TO VERIFICATION IN THAT IT PUTS THE ONUS ON THE STATE DEPLOYING
A STRATEGIC SYSTEM TO DEMONSTRATE ITS VERIFIABILITY TO THE
SATISFACTION OF OTHER STATES (AS OPPOSED TO UNDERTAKING NOT TO
IMPEDE SURVEILLANCE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS). THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO OF THE PROPOSALS, BOTH MILITARY
AND FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF LONG TERM NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES
NEED TO BE CAREFULLY THOUGHT THROUGH BY THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE
(C) THE CANADIANS' THIRD PROPOSAL SEEMS TO RUN COUNTER TO THE
STRATEGIC DOCTRINES OF THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION REPORT
(PARTICULARLY ON THE STABILISING EFFECTS OF MOVING FROM LARGE
MIRVED ICBMS TO SMALLER SINGLE RV MOBILE SYSTEMS), WHICH WAS
ENDORSED BY THE US ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORTED BY OTHER
-ALLIED GOVERNMENTS.

HOWE

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DEFENCE D	RESEARCH D
ACDD	PS
SOVIET D	PS/LADY YOUNG
EED	PS/MR RIFKIND
ECD(E)	PS/MR LUCE
NEWS D	PS/PUS
INFO D	SIR J BULLARD
SED	MR WRIGHT
WED	MR JENKINS
RID	MR CARPLEDGE
PLANNING STAFF	CABINET OFFICE
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Amc 0813

RECEIVED

26 JAN 1984

DESK OFFICER	BELL
INDEX	ACTION

Mr. MacLennan

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Mr Marshall,
NAD

There is here a draft of telegrams on this. No action

29/1

M25/1

1/1

19/1

MR TRUDEAU'S VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE

Now sent to Ottawa (Miss Hughes letter of 25/1)

1/1

by 19/1

1. Mr Schram of the Canadian High Commission called this morning on instructions to say that Mr Trudeau would be visiting Romania, Czechoslovakia and the GDR. He will leave Ottawa on 24 January. The precise programme has not yet been formulated. But the tour of Eastern European capitals will be broken up with a visit to the Davos Symposium on East/West relations in Switzerland.
2. Mr Schram sketched in a little of the background. Mr Trudeau had sent a secret message to Andropov on 11 January urging him to firm-up dates for his projected visit to Moscow to discuss his East/West initiative. The Russians had replied that at a later stage they hoped to be in a position to discuss dates. Mr Schram was in no doubt that the decision to go ahead with a tour of Eastern European capitals stemmed from Moscow's prevaricating response.
3. After discussion with WED I told Mr Schram that the Canadians could expect the Germans to approach them on the do's and dont's of a visit to East Berlin. Mr Schram confirmed that they were expecting this and indeed they had for this reason today informed the FRG of the projected visit.
4. Mr Schram described the pressure that the Canadian Government was coming under as a result of the Russians' refusal, or inability, to set a date for a summit. There was widespread speculation in Canada that Mr Trudeau was planning a trip to Moscow as his grand swan song before resigning and therefore intense interest in when he might be able to achieve this.
5. Mr Schram left with me the attached unclassified guidance telegram from Ottawa. He said that he had been too embarrassed to let us see the preambular paragraph which was full of self-congratulation about the effects of the Trudeau initiative. Ottawa purported to believe that Mr Trudeau's hand could be seen behind President Reagan's new public attitude to East/West relations as reflected in last week's speech. Mr Schram asked (with raised eyebrows) whether the same thought had occurred to us. I replied that I thought President Reagan's change of tack was attributable to lessons learned from conversations with many Western leaders as well as to domestic political conditions.
6. Mr Schram drew my attention somewhat shame-facedly to continued Canadian statements that Mr Trudeau's proposal for a five-power conference had attracted support from the nuclear weapon states (see paragraph 5 of the attached telegram reporting his claim in the Canadian House of Commons that "the idea has been accepted by all the leaders he has seen in one form or another"). Mr Schram

/volunteered

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✓ volunteered that this did not square with any reports that he had seen of conversations with nuclear weapons state governments. I confirmed that it was our understanding that Mr Trudeau had received a negative response from all five. It was clear that he was tailoring his remarks to the requirements of his domestic audience.

7. Mr Schram said that the news of the projected trip to Eastern Europe was being given to our High Commission today. Subject therefore to views from copy addressees I do not think we need to telegraph it.



S W J Fuller
Defence Department
E 309 233 4754

19 January 1984

cc: Mr Cartledge
Mr Macgregor, Soviet Dept
Mr Carter, EED
Miss Himsworth, WED
Mr Soutar, ACDD

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