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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

Joc. Dept
ERD. + JEFD
ACDD
DCAD
Planning Staff

Dear Peter,

8 June 1984
Sir C Titchell
Dr. David
Thorne

ECONOMIC SUMMIT: BILATERAL MEETING WITH MR. TRUDEAU

The Prime Minister had a bilateral meeting with Mr. Trudeau this morning at Lancaster House. I enclose a record of the discussion.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

John ...
John ...

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Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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ment of common values binding Canadians.

The Prime Minister then raised the quest

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRIME
MINISTER OF CANADA AT 0835 HOURS ON FRIDAY 8 JUNE AT LANCASTER HOUSE

Present:

Prime Minister
Mr. Coles

Mr. Trudeau
Mr. Fowler

* * * * *

The Prime Minister asked Mr. Trudeau when he expected finally to retire from Canadian politics. Mr. Trudeau said that a Convention on 16 June would choose the new Party leader. Traditionally, there would then be a period of about a fortnight before he stood down.

The economy was picking up. His Party's position in the polls was improving. The Conservative lead, despite their change of leadership, had been reduced. It would be good for Canada to have a new Prime Minister. Even if in the event he was a Conservative, this would not be the ultimate tragedy.

He wanted to say to the Prime Minister for one last time how grateful he remained to her for her help over the patriation of the Canadian Constitution. This had been the dream of seven successive Canadian Prime Ministers. He had been determined to accomplish it - and was delighted that there was a British Prime Minister who was equally determined. The Charter was already being cited in the courts. It had symbolic importance as a statement of common values binding Canadians.

The Prime Minister then raised the question of the proposed declaration on democratic values. Following the D-Day celebrations, the Federal German Chancellor and the Japanese and Italian Prime Ministers wanted to be seen to be part of the Western alliance. Sherpas had reached agreement on a text the previous evening.

/ Mr. Trudeau

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Mr. Trudeau then said that he had been very pleased with the discussion between Heads of State and Government the night before on the subject of East-West relations. The Prime Minister had stated clearly to her colleagues that there should be a Summit document on this matter. In the Sherpa meetings everyone except the French Personal Representative had apparently agreed to this. But Mitterrand had not seemed to object to the idea. The Prime Minister said that it might be necessary to envisage an alternative to a formal statement - possibly some Presidency conclusions which could be issued to the Press.

Mr. Trudeau said that he had conceived the idea of a message from the Summit to Chernenko which might take the line that although the West and the East did not share common values, they had common objectives. This message could be sent either by the Presidency or by the Summit participants collectively. Such a message would be politically well timed. He had heard of the large CND demonstration which was to take place in London on 9 June. It was important to demonstrate to the peace movement that it was not we but the Russians who were unwilling to negotiate.

The Prime Minister said that one of the most important statements made by President Reagan last night was that the United States did not wish to break the Soviet internal system. Her own view was that the best way to promote a dialogue was to make it plain that we accepted that the Soviet system was there to stay and then work for results that were in the interests of both sides. President Reagan's remark had put a new complexion on United States attitudes.

Agreeing, Mr. Trudeau said that this could be a very reassuring message to get to the Soviet Union. Last year in Williamsburg we had made it clear that INF missiles would be deployed if there was no agreement. Now they had been deployed. The message to convey from this Summit was that we were united

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but that we were not aggressive - we wanted peace. At the previous evening's discussion, Mitterrand, Craxi and Kohl had emphasised the Soviet fear of encirclement.

The Prime Minister said that the two themes that she wanted to stress were the total solidarity of the West and its willingness to conduct dialogue. But the dialogue needed to be measured - Western leaders should not descend in rapid succession on Moscow without adequate consultation.

It was pointed out that President Mitterrand, with his imminent visit to Moscow in mind, might not readily subscribe to the idea of a collective message to the Soviet leadership. Mr. Trudeau said that such a message could give the French President a certain degree of support. Moreover, if it was issued merely in the Chairman's name, the French would be able to make it plain that they were not necessarily bound by everything it contained.

The Prime Minister said that the one point on which she had disagreed with President Mitterrand the previous evening was in relation to his remark that the internal regimes in the Communist world would collapse within twenty years. Mr. Trudeau said that President Mitterrand had made varying predictions as to when these regimes would collapse. The Prime Minister pointed out that if Mitterrand's remark became known publicly, it would undo the value of any message which the Summit might send.

Mr. Trudeau suggested that the message might embody the ten points on East-West relations which he had circulated to Summit participants. The Prime Minister commented that three of these gave her a certain amount of difficulty. Mr. Trudeau replied that he would gladly delete these. The Prime Minister then stated that it might be unwise to be so explicit about our common interests with the Soviet Union. We had to consider the effect this might have on dissidents within the Communist world.

/ Mr. Trudeau

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Mr. Trudeau said that it would be helpful if the Soviet leadership made it plain that they did not expect the Capitalist system to crumble. The Prime Minister said that the most dangerous phenomenon was the isolation of the Soviet leadership. It was not just the fear of encirclement which underlay current Soviet attitudes, but their knowledge that the West had the best tunes to play. The Russians, at root, lacked confidence in their own system. There were difficult tightropes to walk. After she had visited Hungary she had received a message from Czech dissidents who were puzzled as to her objectives. Nevertheless, even dissidents needed freedom from war.

Mr. Trudeau recalled that between 1963 and 1975 the Soviet Union had signed a number of agreements of substance. The Prime Minister said that she was inclined to think that the Russians now regretted having agreed to the human rights provisions in the Helsinki Agreement. The new insecurity was their lack of confidence in their own system. This owed something to the success of major Soviet dissidents like Sakharov and Shcharansky and the activities of Soviet Jewry. Thus, the Russians had many fears which we could not set at rest. But we could convey the message that the West was peace-loving and was not going to start a war. When in Hungary she had found it difficult to convince her interlocutors of U.S. sincerity in this regard.

Turning to Central America, and in response to a question from the Prime Minister, Mr. Trudeau said that the Sandinistas were not a real threat. The Soviet Union could not start a war from Nicaragua. Not only was there not a military threat, but there was no serious ideological threat. The Prime Minister suggested that Nicaragua could become a base for Soviet forces. Mr. Trudeau doubted this. Soviet ships would not be safe in that region. The Russians knew from the Cuban missile crisis that the West would not tolerate the placing of missiles there. He believed that the threat from Nicaragua was vastly exaggerated.

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The Prime Minister said that the United States feared that Communism would spread through Central America to its own borders. Mr. Trudeau said that that was a matter of ideological struggle. He had always conceded that America had every right to make sure that its front yard was kept clean. But it was not going about it the right way. Military methods were inappropriate-- the war that had to be won was the battle of ideas. And there was no doubt that all Latin Americans felt more comfortable in relationship with the United States than with the Soviet Union.

The discussion ended at 0910.

A. J. C.

8 June 1984

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