A Libyan rebel fighter shouts during a fight for the final push to flush out Muammar Gaddafi's forces in Abu Salim district in Tripoli August 25, 2011. Libyan rebels stormed Tripoli's Abu Salim district after NATO air strikes on a building in the area on Thursday.ZOHRA BENSEMRA
Ever since an unidentified White House staffer described the administration's Libya policy as "leading from behind," Barack Obama's political opponents have been trying to hang that regrettable phrase around his neck.
The President and his team had a good reason for trying to change the way international coalitions are formed in response to security challenges. They consider their approach pragmatic and a sharp departure from George W. Bush's provocative aggressiveness. They also feel that it has the international community finally taking on more of the burden for global stability.
Yet there is danger to the White House's strategy and it may yet explode. Despite the rebels' success this week, the jury is still very much out on "leading from behind."
In March, when the revolt against the regime of Colonel Moammar Gadhafi began to boil, the Obama administration was inclined to stay away. But as a Gadhafi armoured column approached Benghazi, the prospect of a humanitarian disaster proved too compelling to ignore. In addition, the President did not want to abandon America's European allies, which have critical security interests across the Mediterranean.
So he and his advisers settled on a supporting role for the United States, with Britain, France, Italy and other countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the lead. For the air campaign over Libya, NATO's European members would have responsibility for routine patrol and strike missions. The United States would provide essential support, such as the suppression of Libya's air-defence system, intelligence collection and analysis, and logistics, capabilities that only the U.S. military seems to possess in sufficient quantities.
The Obama team saw much to like about this secondary role. In contrast to the Bush years, the United States was not the bogeyman leading the operation, which White House officials believed would make it more difficult for opponents to stir up trouble. Second, after much talk over the years, there would finally be a concrete example of NATO partners sharing the burden. Third, the United States was unlikely to suffer casualties. Fourth, its contribution would tap military assets that are not used much in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In short, the administration probably believed that it had found a way to do something that carried little risk and could serve as a template for the future. Unfortunately, the risk is far greater than it seems.
There is a reason that leaders of great powers usually prefer to be fully in command of military operations – since they will ultimately be held responsible for the outcome. In Libya, the U.S. gambled both that the rebels could win and that NATO had enough air power to sustain an attack. Had the Gadhafi forces been able to outlast NATO and the rebels, and the campaign become "too big to fail," the United States could have found itself the victim of moral hazard. With the deepest military pockets, it could have been required to bail out a botched intervention despite playing just a supporting role.
Happily, the Gadhafi era is effectively over – the Libyan people showed great bravery and now have an opportunity for a better life – but the greatest risks for those who interceded on their behalf are just beginning.
Western military interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and now Libya show that some authoritarian regimes are in reality so fragile that a small amount of force, in the form of air power and covert operations, can bring them down surprisingly quickly. It is during the "postwar" period that the hazards to the civilian population, not to mention to Western budgets and prestige, get worse.
Col. Gadhafi provided a focal point for the rebellion, but with him gone, Libya's tribes and factions will soon turn to the distribution of political power and resources. In a nation with no real history of self-government, such a competition could get very ugly. The West's recent interventions have all required large numbers of "boots on the ground" to ensure stability afterward. NATO policy-makers swear that this time will be different, with no chance of European or American soldiers going ashore.
But should mayhem break out, the "responsibility to protect" would seem even more compelling, given NATO's role thus far. Bloodletting and a mass migration of refugees would be too much to ignore, but the countries that led the campaign would be hard-pressed to find the soldiers and the money needed to stabilize Libya. A U.S. bailout, in the form of another large deployment, would likely be required.
Should it come to that, the true nature of the gamble Mr. Obama took a few months ago will become clear – and he will have a hard time explaining what makes "leading from behind" such a good idea.
Robert Haddick is managing editor of Small Wars Journal and a columnist for Foreign Policy.