A poster of deposed Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi that reads "Yes to legitimacy; no to the coup" lies amid the debris of a cleared protest camp outside the burnt Rabaa Adawiya mosque in Cairo in this August 15, 2013 file photo.MOHAMED ABD EL GHANY/Reuters
It was October 6, 1981. The distance between my home and the bakery was no more than a few hundred meters, yet it felt like an endless journey. The vibrant streets of Cairo were reduced to a deafening silence, as if everyone had disappeared. My mother and I were totally unaware that president Anwar Sadat had been assassinated by Islamists. In the eerily empty street, I met my first Army officer. He was bemused by my childish determination when I said, "I left home to get bread, I will not go back without it." Miraculously, I got the bread and went back home with a new word added to my vocabulary, "curfew." It was a word that I did not fully understand, as the deeper meaning and implications were lost to my childhood mind. I did know, however, that this word made Cairo a spooky place.
This summer, in the days since the forced ending of the sit-ins in support of ousted Islamist president Mohammed Morsi, those terrifying moments of 1981 have come back to haunt me. The events continue to unfold in Egypt with rage, violence and a tragic loss of life, along with the declaration of a state of emergency. In addition, the Egyptian government hints that it may declare the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. Egypt's new constitution (still in deliberations) may also outlaw religious political parties.
The ongoing crisis has a different context and narrative; it nonetheless poses the same question that many Egyptians were asking in 1981: "How will Egypt's Islamists deal with the leadership's brutal crackdown?"
In theory, there are two main options being discussed by observers. These are referred to as the Algerian and the Turkish scenarios. In the Algerian scenario, the forced ending of the sit-ins, the calls for disbandment of the Muslim Brotherhood and the arrest of many Islamist cadres may tempt the Brotherhood and other groups to revise their stance on violence and revert from low-simmer aggression to a full-fledged violent campaign like the one launched by their Algerian brothers following the cancellation of the 1991-92 election in Algeria. The hypothesis that violence breeds violence is not just plausible, it also fits in with the Islamists' defiant ideology.
However, the history of the Islamists in Egypt dismisses the Algerian scenario. Despite founding president Gamal Abdel Nasser's brutal oppression of Islamists and banning of the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamism had slowly emerged after years of dormancy. Some groups, mainly the Brotherhood, had opted to reinforce their social basis rather than taking arms, and focused on gaining popularity in target areas like student unions and syndicates. This was seen as a preparatory phase for full-scale political participation. Meanwhile, some other radical groups opted for violent confrontations with the government, but only in late 1970s after Mr. Sadat's peace treaty with Israel. In hindsight, the 1981 emergency law and the assassination of Mr. Sadat were a blessing in disguise for the Muslim Brotherhood.
Despite maintaining warm relationships with other radical groups, the Brothers were generally perceived as non-violent victims, oppressed by the regime. Mr. Mubarak (who succeeded Mr. Sadat) has turned a blind eye to the Brotherhood's widespread social activities.
In contrast, 2013 has brought completely different challenges to the Brotherhood, as the group has now lost the trust of a wide section of Egyptian society. Now its leaders are relying on other partners in an " anti-coup coalition" in order to provide a good cover for the embattled, severely weakened Muslim Brotherhood. If the current ruthless crackdown continues, this coalition may decide to engage in a long standoff with the army that would make the violent confrontations of the '80s and '90s look like an elegant tea party, while allowing the Brotherhood as a group to mask itself and claim a "peaceful" stance.
The other alternative for the Brotherhood is the Turkish model. Some have drawn comparisons between Turkey's ex-leader Necmettin Erbakan and Mr. Morsi – both Islamist leaders removed from office by the military – while others like to compare General Sisi and Turkish General Kenan Evren. Regardless of these mostly hollow comparisons, Turkey is living proof that Islamists can survive military coups and even win post-coup elections. Can Egyptian Islamists emulate the Turkish experience? Can they sideline their old guard and reform the party from within?
It is a possibility that should not be dismissed, but it is still unlikely in the near future. There are two reasons for this. First, the current leaders of Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) are openly accepting Brotherhood narratives and refusing to acknowledge that their "Egyptian Brothers" have committed grave errors of judgment. Such a myopic Turkish stance, which contradicts the AKP's own erstwhile non-defiance policy against Turkey's military coup, does not encourage the Brotherhood to adopt more pragmatic, liberal reforms. Second, and more importantly, the core of the Brotherhood is inherently authoritarian, and it regards its authoritarianism as an appealing card that wins hearts and mind among their core conservative supporters.
Perhaps there are other tactics that the Brotherhood may try. There is a possibility that they may attempt to divide the Egyptian army and recruit junior cadres to create an Egyptian version of the Free Syrian army. Some Islamists even openly admitted this intention during the sit-ins. This approach may not be successful initially, but a long standoff with the army may challenge the loyalties of middle-ranking officer corps and conscripts. The Egyptian army is stretched and has already called on reserve ranks. I doubt they will succeed; the army chief, General Sisi, is still very popular within the ranks; he is also a very conservative Muslim who has succeeded to a large extent in forging a new national identity that counters the Islamist ideology.
Another important factor that may decide the future of the Muslim Brotherhood is their funding. Thus far, the group has had no problems with financing; however, the group's funds have now been frozen inside of Egypt and the rising hostility against the group in many Arab countries may create enough of a financial crisis to curtail its activities. Nonetheless, the international wings of the Muslim Brotherhood will not leave the parent group in Egypt to suffocate financially and will make every effort to help them to survive.
Thus, after looking at these scenarios, it is difficult to predict how the current standoff will end between Egypt's two major illiberal forces, the Muslim Brotherhood and the military.
Regardless, Egyptians should not be distracted by those who are trying to pull the country back to the old days of authoritarianism. We should instead focus on the goals of our revolution: bread, freedom, and social justice. These demands will not happen without an inclusive constitution that doesn't exclude any section of the Egyptian society, but which prevents the abuse of religion in politics. This delicate balance is crucial for the salvation of Egypt. Since my childhood, our democratic aspirations have proven to be elusive to achieve; we cannot afford to waste another opportunity to grasp these goals. History will not forgive us if we waste this chance.
Nervana Mahmoud is a British-Egyptian blogger and commentator on Middle East issues. She blogs at Nervana and tweets at @nervana_1.