A new Canadian holds a flag at a citizenship ceremony on Parliament Hill in Ottawa in April, 2019.Sean Kilpatrick/The Canadian Press
James Yousif is a lawyer, former director of policy at IRCC and former member of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB).
For an organization with a budget of nearly $350-million and 2,500 employees, the IRB is something of a mystery.
Structurally, it is an outlier, at “arm’s length” from government. Most organizations of that size and scope do not have the authority to develop public policy without the involvement of ministers, deputy ministers and possibly cabinet. But the IRB possesses policy authorities into which the rest of government has limited lines of sight.
This may help explain how the IRB was able to adopt a policy that dispensed with core adjudicative safeguards, and accepted refugee claims solely on the basis of the written application, without in-person hearings. This has significant implications for the integrity of Canada’s refugee system.
During the asylum policy reforms of 2010, I found the IRB to be an awkward partner, resistant to discussions about how they might implement the policy options under consideration, invoking their quasi-independent status. Although the IRB reports to Parliament through the Minister of Immigration, we could not see it clearly, nor could we predict its actions.
The policy reforms and budget allocations of 2010 were predicated upon the IRB’s promise to bring an end to a long-standing backlog of asylum claims. New time-processing standards for asylum hearings were established and supported by the hiring of a new, permanent staff of adjudicators.
In the years that followed, the promised targets were not met, and by 2017 a new asylum backlog had emerged. The government commissioned an independent review during which “major structural reform” was considered. The options included the possible dissolution of the Refugee Protection Division, which is the IRB tribunal that hears asylum claims and decides who receives refugee protection, and the transfer of its function into the IRCC departmental framework. The IRB was suddenly under immense pressure to demonstrate a higher rate of decisions.
It took drastic measures.
Negative decisions – rejecting asylum claims – consume time and resources because they must be carefully written in anticipation of appeal. By contrast, positive decisions can be made rapidly and in large numbers. The IRB developed a policy called “File Review,” which allowed asylum claims to be rapidly accepted in large numbers from a list of countries on the basis of the untested written application and documents in each file, and without refugees being questioned at a hearing. The policy appears to have been implemented unilaterally, without the approval of ministers or cabinet. For example, between January, 2019, and February, 2023, 24,599 asylum claimants were accepted without being asked a single question.
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As I document in a new study for the C.D. Howe Institute, this policy is problematic. Not all asylum claims are truthful, and documents may be forged. But this is impossible to detect without asking questions. The asylum hearing also serves as a screen for national security and program integrity risk, and must be halted if red flags emerge during questioning to allow the relevant minister to be notified. That mechanism cannot be engaged if claimants are never questioned.
More broadly, the IRB’s recognition rate for asylum claims has climbed to 80 per cent of claims decided on their merits, excluding files summarily closed where the claim was withdrawn or abandoned. In comparison, in 2024 Ireland accepted 30 per cent of claims on the merits, Sweden 40 per cent, and Germany 59 per cent. Research suggests that acceptance rates are a significant factor in asylum seekers’ choice of a destination country.
It is difficult to isolate the effect of any single policy change on the level of new claims, given multiple factors such as rising global migration pressures and changes to temporary immigration policies. That said, it is worth noting that the number of new asylum claims in Canada has increased since the IRB began rapidly accepting claims. A backlog of 17,000 claims in 2016 has grown to nearly 300,000 in 2025. Policies such as File Review, intended to reduce the backlog, have not only failed to do so, but may have reinforced perceptions of speed, success, and reduced scrutiny, signalling to the world that Canada’s asylum system is easy.
How was it possible for an adjudicative tribunal to implement a policy that dispenses with the act of adjudication?
Perhaps part of the answer is that the institution cannot be seen clearly. Its unique status and structure have rendered it opaque to the rest of government, which otherwise might have corrected an overreach. It may be time to rethink this model and consider options that provide ministers and cabinet with direct visibility and policy oversight, while preserving fair and independent adjudication.