Peter Jones is a professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa.
The past few months have featured a number of warnings over Canada’s defence capability. Our allies are dramatically increasing their defence spending. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg recently announced that 18 of its 31 member countries will meet or exceed the goal of spending 2 per cent of their GDP on defence this year, which is a substantial increase. He also rather pointedly said that he expects Canada to provide a schedule of when it will reach this target.
The threats we face are different from any since the Cold War ended. When the USSR disbanded it was widely believed that the era of what might be called “big war” was over. The danger that fleets of tanks would roll across Europe was finished, as was the possibility of large-scale maritime engagements aimed at wresting control of sea.
Instead, we faced skirmish wars involving determined adversaries in developing countries, such as Afghanistan and Yemen. These would have their own challenges, to be sure, but they would not contain the threat of the kinds of massive, globe-spanning conflicts we feared during the Cold War.
This is now changing. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its threats to other European countries, and China’s growing threat to invade Taiwan and take other steps to assert its territorial and maritime ambitions mean that the possibility of “big wars” is back. Moreover, large-scale conflicts in the form of cyberattacks are already commonplace.
And we cannot rely on nuclear deterrence to prevent large conventional wars. Our adversaries have shown that they are willing to initiate such conflict despite the presence of nuclear weapons. Unless countries are prepared to deter conventional conflicts by credibly threatening that they will “go nuclear,” as we did during the Cold War (and no sane person would want to go back to those days), we will have to be prepared to meet these challenges conventionally.
Canada is woefully unprepared. When the Cold War ended, we embraced the new reality and reduced defence spending. It is often forgotten that Canada consistently spent more than 2 per cent of GDP on defence throughout the Cold War, at times well over 2 per cent. We were not alone in dropping our defence spending after the Cold War ended, of course, but we went further than most.
In 2014, NATO allies adopted a commitment to the 2-per-cent target in the wake of Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine, which was meant to reverse the trend. We have never come close to this target. Presently, our defence spending, at 1.38 per cent, is near the bottom of the list of NATO allies. Though recently announced investments will raise it a bit, we remain in the basement.
The question for Canada is whether we are going to step up to the new reality, or bury our heads in the sand and hope others will tackle it. Leaving aside the calls from allies for us to do more (and the outright threats from some if we don’t), our security and prosperity demand that we act. We have a stake in the international order; our prosperity depends on the free flow of goods around the world.
All of this will require a major shift in the mindset of Canadians when it comes to defence. It is not just about headline-generating one-time purchases of expensive pieces of equipment; it is about the recreation and long-term sustainment of broad capabilities. In addition to spending substantially more, we must do so efficiently.
The defence budget should be optimized toward actual defence capability; it is not primarily a regional development tool. Much attention will have to be paid to mundane but crucial issues, such as recreating the ability to recruit, train and retain military personnel in far larger numbers. The war in Ukraine has shown that the West’s defence industrial base has declined dangerously; the fact that the West cannot supply enough basic ammunition to Ukraine and does not have the industrial capacity to quickly ramp up production is appalling. When it comes to equipment purchases, we need to be faster and more nimble, and to accept some risk. We can no longer allow literally decades of politics and red tape to get between the identification of a need and an acquisition. The F-35 fighter jets are a case in point, as is the seemingly endless process to replace the Navy’s aging frigates.
The investments required to fix these deficiencies will be extensive. Indeed, 2 per cent may be a floor rather than a ceiling for some time, as we recreate capabilities we allowed to wither away. We need to think of this as insurance. What we spend may help to deter a serious war, which would cost infinitely more. And if, heaven forbid, war does come, being adequately prepared will make it less costly in lives and resources.
I do not wish to be alarmist; a big war with Russia or China in the next 10 years is not inevitable. But the chances of it are no longer zero, either. We have to wrap our heads around this and the fact that it is a long-term reality. It took four decades for the Cold War to resolve itself, and we should prepare ourselves for a similar challenge.
Still, I am not pessimistic. We saw off this threat before, through patient firmness. We can do it again – but only if we wake up to it.