Stephanie Carvin and Leah West are associate professors at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. Jessica Davis is the president and CEO of Insight Threat Intelligence. All formerly worked in national security for the federal government.
When is a diplomat not a diplomat?
A new and damning report about the Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP) by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), the independent body responsible for reviewing Canada’s national security and intelligence activities, puts this question front-and-centre.
The GSRP, which was created under the umbrella of Global Affairs Canada (GAC) in the wake of the Sept. 11 terror attacks, has 30 officers stationed around the world dedicated to collecting information of interest to Canadian security, intelligence, defence and foreign policy. While such information-gathering is a normal part of the functions and responsibilities of diplomats, the NSIRA review makes it clear that the GSRP has been operating in a grey zone between diplomatic reporting and intelligence collection, putting Canada’s interests, diplomats, GSRP officers and their contacts at risk.
What’s more, while the program has been controversial of late after Michael Spavor alleged that giving information to former GSRP officer Michael Kovrig led to his detention in China, this review was launched years ago – and GAC still has not demonstrated it has a plan to engage in serious reform of the program. The issues outlined might still be putting Canadian security at risk.
There are several concerning themes throughout the report, primarily relating to problems stemming from a lack of governance, legal training, advice and support. For example, GSRP officers did not seem to have a good understanding of the limits of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which establishes the rights and duties of states and diplomatic personnel in the conduct of missions abroad. While GAC insists that all of its officers abide by the convention because they are not working covertly and do not pay for information, this is not the legal test. The convention only permits the collection of information about the conditions and development of the state through the use of lawful means. Using sources to gain access to information that is protected or classified, even when it is given freely, is likely a violation of the host state’s laws and therefore falls afoul of the convention. It could also put GSRP contacts in danger.
There are other issues arising from the GSRP’s grey-zone existence, including co-ordination problems with Canada’s intelligence community. While difficult interagency rivalries are not uncommon, GSRP’s relationship with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service is often unproductive. The report found that, in one instance, GAC prevented CSIS from engaging with a foreign agency because they wanted to do so themselves. This is an unacceptable reason to inhibit intelligence co-operation.
In its response to the report, GAC asserted its primacy over international relationships, including those with foreign intelligence agencies, because the Minister of Foreign Affairs has “an overall leadership role” in Canada’s “foreign intelligence function,” making the minister the “primary risk owner” for foreign intelligence collection. While this may be true, intelligence and national security are not the responsibility of a single department or minister. Marking territory in response to serious concerns over interagency co-ordination is troubling, to say the least.
Ultimately, the report warns that the problems with GSRP are the consequence of engaging in foreign human intelligence on the cheap.
The program cannot live in a halfway house between diplomatic reporting and intelligence-gathering; the risks are simply too high. For example, GSRP has not created a contact management program because that would (in its view) be too much like an intelligence “contact handling” program. Yet when these contacts find themselves in precarious circumstances, GSRP officers are left without guidance on how to mitigate those challenges.
We support NSIRA’s call not for legal reform, but an overhaul of the operational basis of the program, including creating enhanced legal analysis and training, a well-developed governance and policy framework, and better support for GSRP officers in the field. But GAC also needs to answer for its program, and assure Canadians that it will seriously undertake reform. To that end, hearing from GAC at a parliamentary committee on the matter would be welcome. The GAC response indicating NSIRA’s recommendations will be a part of “advancing improvements” is insufficient. This is not a circumstance where lawmakers should be satisfied with tinkering around the edges.
Most importantly, as the NSIRA notes, Canada needs to decide what kind of foreign information it needs in order to navigate the challenges of the 21st century. An underfunded, undersupported and under-governed security reporting program operating in a sea of ambiguity is no way to do this. Without proper reforms and an effort to develop a meaningful vision, the GSRP program could prove to be detrimental to Canadian security, not an enhancement.