Nancy Qian is a professor of managerial economics and decision sciences at Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management, a co-director of Northwestern’s Global Poverty Research Lab and the founding director of China Econ Lab.
China’s leaders always knew that they would have to abandon their “zero-COVID” policy eventually, and that the longer they waited, the more painful the transition would be. Yet they seemed unable to leave it behind and move on.
Then, an apartment-building blaze in the locked-down Xinjiang region killed 10 people whose escapes were reportedly thwarted by locked doors and blocked entrances, sparking China’s largest anti-government protests since the Tiananmen movement of 1989. The demonstrations have been an expression of the frustration and anger that has accumulated over nearly three years of aggressive lockdowns. Families have been stuck in their homes for months, unable to visit dying loved ones, access regular health care, or even buy food.
Compared to 1989, the government’s response was notably moderate: police dispersed demonstrations with relatively little violence, though this partly reflected their ability to use new surveillance technologies to track down and discourage protesters. But China’s government has also apparently listened to the protesters. It has now scrapped some of its harsher COVID policies, such as the requirement to quarantine in state facilities.
The path out of the zero-COVID policies will be long and difficult – and not only from a health perspective. The recent upheaval points to broader political challenges that China will face in the years to come.
The action plan for exiting zero-COVID has been known to Chinese leaders for some time. They must boost the population’s immunity through some combination of higher vaccination rates and more effective foreign vaccines. Otherwise, epidemiologists estimate that opening up could cause between one and two million additional COVID deaths in China.
For a population of 1.4 billion, even two million deaths would amount to a much lower mortality rate than in the United States. But, after years spent suffering under strict lockdowns, the Chinese people are unlikely to find this distinction comforting. China has attempted to ease its pandemic restrictions before, only to tighten them when cases surged. This pattern is likely to continue until enough of the elderly are vaccinated and both the government and the public accept the increased risk of infection and death.
What sets China apart are the political stakes. Zero-COVID was the subject of a power struggle that played out largely behind closed doors between President Xi Jinping, who was committed to the hard line approach, and moderates, such as Prime Minister Li Keqiang. Mr. Xi won, hands down. China maintained a zero-COVID rate, and Mr. Xi was appointed to an unprecedented third term as the Communist Party of China’s General Secretary in October. The leadership of the Standing Committee, including Mr. Li, was replaced by Xi loyalists.
But this is not just about one man. The zero-COVID drama could threaten the legitimacy of the entire Chinese government, as its autocracy masks systemic instability. When citizens of democracies are dissatisfied with their politicians’ performance, they vote them out of office. But China lacks a formal mechanism for its people to meaningfully affect policy, so unhappy citizens must resort to “illegal” forms of expression, like protests.
Since these activities are outside the rules, they erode the country’s institutional structure. Moreover, in a one-party system, a protest against government policy amounts to a protest against the Party, and thus, the entire regime. This is especially true at the present time because Mr. Xi has consolidated his hold on power. In fact, during the recent demonstrations, some protesters called for Mr. Xi’s removal as General Secretary and even for the end of CPC rule.
In today’s China, disagreeing with any government policy is tantamount to disagreeing with Mr. Xi – and thus, the CPC. This creates a dilemma for moderates: if they disagree with the official government position on an issue, they must choose between challenging it or defending the Party’s legitimacy and the regime’s stability.
Before the pandemic, protests in China were often followed by increased police surveillance and a decline in popular resistance. This time is unlikely to be different. The CPC does not want its capitulation on zero-COVID to encourage citizens to take to the streets whenever they disagree with a policy decision. Even as the government eases pandemic restrictions, it will tighten further control over the public sphere.
Recent developments thus bring mixed tidings for the Chinese people. Optimists can say that the end of zero-COVID is finally in sight. Pessimists will point to the public’s rejection of the government’s COVID rules, noting how this raised the political stakes for the next controversial policy – a sign that the coming years are likely to bring ever tighter government control amid rising instability.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2022. www.project-syndicate.org