Prime Minister Mark Carney checks out an Orion-H9 Counter-UAS, a directional drone disrupter, as he visits a vehicle display at the Adazi Military base in Latvia in August, 2025.Christinne Muschi/The Canadian Press
Bob Rae is a Matthews Fellow in Public Policy at Queen’s University, The Visitor at Massey College and a Distinguished Fellow at the University of Toronto’s Munk School.
Michael Murphy is the director of the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen’s University.
Eugene Lang is acting director of the Queen’s University School of Policy Studies.
Prime Minister Mark Carney’s January address to the World Economic Forum called for Canada to join with other middle powers in following a path that is both principled and pragmatic. He argued that we are witnessing a rupture in the rules-based international order, and must rethink how we engage with the world. Our fundamental assumptions about Canada’s place in the international economy and the global security environment, he said, must be re-examined.
So Canada’s next defence policy will be the most consequential in at least half a century – not only because it must chart this path independent of American interests, but also because it must provide direction to the unprecedented influx of defence spending. A clear vision is only more critical now that the Defence Industrial Strategy has anchored Canadian sovereignty and prosperity in the defence sector.
The Davos message aligns with the Prime Minister’s address on national defence last June, where he called for a radical shift in defence policy and promised that “National Defence will immediately design a new defence policy that reflects both today and tomorrow’s threats.” But although the message has remained consistent for the past six months – middle powers must reorient their strategic engagement to the changing world – no new defence policy has emerged.
For the policy to align with the new vision, it must question two foundational dogmas: first, the defining of Canadian defence only in terms of contributions to NORAD and NATO; and second, that greater integration with the U.S. necessarily supports greater Canadian security.
Carney says new defence industrial strategy will reduce reliance on U.S. for gear
Mr. Carney’s vision for “variable geometry” recognizes that Canada will participate in various bilateral and multilateral arrangements beyond its default alliances, including finding points of mutual interest with countries we may not always agree with. This strategy involves continuing partnerships where beneficial opportunities lie, and exploring new relationships. But this is only possible if the new strategy recognizes that Canada’s national interests are more than the sum of its NORAD and NATO obligations.
This shift will have practical ramifications. Current practices for major defence procurement are often crafted explicitly to meet NORAD-plus-NATO commitments, rather than to meet Canadian-defined needs. Consider, as a case in point, the current acquisition of 88 fighter jets to satisfy NORAD and NATO legacy commitments. If Canada is to play a more active role on the world stage, in terms of its own defence as well as its contributions to multilateral initiatives around the world, a new defence policy defined around a national interest would provide a new target for fighter jets.
The second dogma, a cornerstone of Canadian defence policy since the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940, holds that greater integration with the U.S. means greater security for Canada. A new defence policy must overcome this assumption, instead recognizing the risk mitigation offered by diversified relationships and the security (both physical and economic) offered by sovereign capacity. Building this capacity will involve Canadians accepting trade-offs to invest in a sector where we are not used to seeing our tax dollars flow. But the long-term result will mean secure supply chains and new industrial development. These major shifts in the scale and process of procurement and acquisition require clear guidance from the new defence policy.
In addition, Canada must assess security threats that are present in the hemisphere, as well as globally. For too long we have kept this broader lens out of our sights, ignoring the United Nations, regional actors and the harsh reality that we can no longer assume full alignment between American assessments of their security and our own. More effective, joined-up strategies to deal with deep instability in countries like Haiti are essential. The UN needs to do its own review of peacekeeping, but Canada can only play a role in this process if Ottawa takes these issues and approaches more seriously.
A robust defence policy review must overcome the fallbacks of incrementalism and path dependency. These forces run counter to the Prime Minister’s call for an ambitious response to a moment of rupture. Similarly, the strategy of building consensus through long public consultations also works against the imperative for speed and the new recognition that all alliances have their limits. A review, convened at speed with voices beyond the orthodoxy, is required to overcome these practical challenges – as is the long-promised defence policy, at last.