A model TKMS submarine on display in Ankara, Turkey, on July 7.MICHAEL KAPPELER/AFP/Getty Images
Michael Byers teaches global politics and international law at the University of British Columbia.
“Good on Canada for avoiding our mistakes.”
I have heard this comment repeatedly recently, while interviewing Australian policy experts about, among other things, Canada’s recent decision to buy 12 conventionally powered German-made submarines. (Though the language itself has been more colourful – I have learned a lot of new Australian slang.)
Australia had a contract for 12 similar French-made submarines – until 2021, when then-prime minister Scott Morrison cancelled the deal and joined U.S. president Joe Biden and British prime minister Boris Johnson in announcing a security partnership called AUKUS.
As part of the new deal, Australia will acquire eight nuclear-powered submarines. The first three will be Virginia-class, acquired second-hand from the U.S. The remaining five will be a new AUKUS-class, to be developed by Britain.
Acquiring and operating the fleet will be very expensive, with an estimated cost of $362-billion – not including the cost of disposing of the nuclear fuel when the submarines are decommissioned.
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A portion of the money will be sent to the U.S. to help speed up the production of Virginia-class submarines and thus free up the three second-hand vessels. Another portion will go to Britain to help rejuvenate its neglected submarine-building industry.
The numbers are concerning enough. But now, former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans is predicting that Australia’s submarines will be subsumed into the command structure of the U.S. Pacific Fleet as Washington focuses on containing China. AUKUS provides U.S. naval planners with a nuclear-submarine base in Western Australia, on the coast of the Indian Ocean.
Another problem is that all of the submarines will be powered by Uranium-235 that has been enriched to 93 per cent – a higher percentage than the uranium used in the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. This runs contrary to the object and purpose of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which restricts the transfer of weapons-grade fuel to non-nuclear weapon states.
Australia argues that such transfers are permitted, since the treaty does not explicitly prohibit the transfer of weapons-grade fuel for naval propulsion. But even then, Australia receiving such fuel could encourage other non-nuclear weapon states to claim that they, too, require weapons-grade fuel for their naval vessels.
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With Uranium-235 having a half-life of 704 million years, the fuel will remain at weapons-grade long after the submarines are cut up for scrap metal. And the more places that weapons-grade fuel exists in the world, the more likely that some of it will fall into the wrong hands at some point.
How did Australia get itself into this mess?
AUKUS was negotiated when the U.S. was a reliable ally. That is no longer the case, but it would take a brave prime minister to tell Donald Trump the deal was cancelled.
Australian politics at the time also played a role. AUKUS was announced during an election year and could have become a wedge issue between Mr. Morrison’s governing Liberals and the opposition Labor Party.
Sensing a trap, Labor Leader Anthony Albanese embraced AUKUS. He has maintained that position now that he is Prime Minister. But four years after it was announced, AUKUS remains a dominant issue in Australian politics, and his Labor Party has split over the agreement, with former prime minister Paul Keating leading the revolt.
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Canada’s submarine procurement offers a sharp contrast. Thanks to hydrogen fuel-cells, Canada’s submarines would be able to remain submerged for up to one month. They will also be extremely quiet, making them almost impossible to detect.
The submarines will come from an operational production line. Canada’s partners in the project, Germany and Norway, are stable and reliable allies.
Of course, many things could still go wrong. The German company TKMS has only provisionally been selected. With contract negotiations continuing, a switch to another supplier remains possible.
It is also possible that the Royal Canadian Navy will want to modify the submarines, for instance, to use American rather than European-made torpedoes. That is what happened when Canada bought four second-hand British submarines in 1998, adding costs and delays.
Another challenge will be recruiting enough submariners to enable the operation of a 12-boat fleet. This a job that most people would hate – living communally in a tightly enclosed space, not seeing the sky, breathing fresh air, or communicating with family. Yet for a brave few, working with high-tech machines is a powerful draw.
The recruits will also require extensive training. A modern submarine is as complex as a fifth-generation fighter jet, and does not have ejection seats.
Still, this procurement is on a viable course. And Canadians might be pleased to know that Australians are more than envious.