Dennis Horak was Canada’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 2015 to 2018, when the Saudi government expelled him from the country as a persona non grata. He was also head of mission in Iran from 2009 to 2012 and director of the Middle East Division in Ottawa from 2012 to 2015.
After seeing the carnage of Oct. 7, it is hard to fathom that there was much method to the madness that day. Beyond the hatred of those who carried out those attacks, Hamas’s strategic objective appears to have been to provoke an Israeli response that would lead to its demonization and isolation. Early returns on that effort show pretty broad success on all fronts.
But many have suggested Hamas was also at least partly motivated by the increasing possibility that Saudi Arabia could normalize relations with Israel. That includes U.S. President Joe Biden: “One of the reasons Hamas moved on Israel … they knew that I was about to sit down with the Saudis,” he said last month. “Guess what? The Saudis wanted to recognize Israel.” Indeed, just two weeks before the attack, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signalled to the United Nations General Assembly that a breakthrough deal with Saudi Arabia could be close: “Such a peace will go a long way in ending Arab-Israeli conflict and will encourage other Arab states to normalize their relations with Israel.” This all follows the 2020 signing of the Abraham Accords, which saw Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates establish full ties with Israel; Riyadh was supportive of the principle of normalization at the time, and it is hard to believe Bahrain would have signed on without Saudi Arabia’s approval.
But even before Oct. 7 and the ensuing conflict in Gaza, significant progress in U.S.-brokered talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia had remained elusive – and given the right-wing Israeli government, that should not be a surprise. The Saudis have also continued to make clear that normalization can only come with Israeli concessions on Palestinian issues. That principle is embodied within the Arab Peace Initiative (API), which was brokered by Saudi Arabia’s late King Abdullah and adopted by the Arab League in 2002, and is a belief shared by the current monarch, King Salman, who in my experience was one of the very few regional leaders who, regularly and unprompted, still focused on Palestinian issues in meetings with foreign leaders and diplomats. Riyadh is also loath to allow its rival Iran to position itself as the regional champion of Palestinians’ dreams.
It feels nearly impossible now to feel hopeful about progress on normalization. As things stand, Israel will be lucky to hang on to the relationships it already has with regional partners, let alone open new avenues – even if few of its existing international partners have, as yet, broken ties. But conventional wisdom rarely holds in the Middle East. While the Saudis have busied themselves burnishing their solidarity credentials, including by hosting an Arab and Islamic summit to press Israel for a ceasefire, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) affirmed in a phone call with Mr. Biden last month that they would continue to strive for a sustainable peace, “building on the work that was already under way between Saudi Arabia and the United States over recent months” – a clear allusion to the normalization discussions.
Saudi Arabia’s apparent readiness, in due course, to return to the issue of normalization as a pathway to peace should not really be a surprise. The main drivers for normalization in the first place remain as pertinent now as they were on Oct. 6. After all, the Saudis (and others) did not seek to expand ties with Israel because they loved the country or Mr. Netanyahu; they did it because it was in their interest to do so. There are certainly more complications now, but those interests have really not changed – and so the dream of Saudi-Israeli normalization is not dead.
MBS has a vision for a region unburdened by continuing conflict. He wants to make the Middle East attractive for investment and prosperity, and his desire to improve ties with Iran, stabilize Syria and even seek a settlement in Yemen reflect this. Establishing ties with Israel, while also seeking progress on Palestinian issues, were a part of the same picture. An end to perpetual conflict in the region is good for everyone, not least Saudi Arabia, which is looking to solidify its regional leadership and prosperity going forward.
More pointedly, Saudi Arabia’s desire to improve ties with Israel also reflected, to a significant degree, Riyadh’s continuing concerns about the threat posed by Iran. The principle of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” still resonates in Saudi Arabia, and that “friend,” in this case, is still Israel. Notwithstanding recent efforts to improve links with Tehran, the Saudis do not trust Iran and likely never will. In fact, the brutality of the Hamas attack, the subsequent support shown by Hezbollah on Israel’s northern border, missile launches from Yemen toward Israel by Houthi rebels, and smaller-scale attacks directed at U.S. and allied forces in Iraq and Syria by Iranian-supported militias likely only reinforce, in Saudi minds, how troublesome and capable Iran and its regional proxies can be. For Riyadh, counters to Iran are important, and Israel can still be one under the right conditions.
Of course, getting back there will be hard, and it will take time. The Arab world is furious with the destruction in Gaza, and even dictators have to pay attention to public opinion sometimes. Arabs will not easily stomach a quick or easy return to the status quo. Extremist elements on both sides will fight hard against concessions, with the trauma of Oct. 7 and its deadly aftermath fuelling rejectionist arguments for victory over compromise.
Coming out of this war, Israel will be under tremendous pressure to find a new way to deal with Palestinian aspirations and anger. Security will be paramount for a traumatized Israel. But in time, Israel may be convinced that a new regional paradigm that genuinely ends its isolation, coupled with a concerted regional effort to develop and support more responsible, less corrupt Palestinian leadership, could address Israel’s legitimate security concerns more effectively than the periodic returns to armed conflict we have seen repeated countless times over the decades. The Saudis have the heft and bankroll to do this, and they appear more willing to use it than they were before – and they will need to, if they really want a region centred on prosperity rather than conflict.
The wild card in all this, as always, is Iran. Its government has its own interests at play in the region and they don’t mesh easily – or at all, really – with the desire most Israelis and Palestinians have, which is to just get on with their lives in peace. Iran’s support for the Palestinian cause is ideological and tied to the regime’s revolutionary ethos, but it is also supremely self-interested: The rejectionist groups it supports, such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah, are elements of Iran’s forward defence against Israel. They are useful tools to keep Israel on its toes and potential instruments to mobilize in the event of conflict, and Iran will not give them up easily – nor will these groups and their leaders, who profit immensely from the continuing conflict, be willing to simply abandon their revenue streams.
But the outcome is not entirely up to Tehran. If, after the war, the Palestinians are given hope for a better future, they will be better positioned to counter the efforts of an outside power and its allies to play spoiler for their own purposes. When the dust settles on this war and Hamas’s responsibility for the carnage that ensued sets in, Iran’s standing, along with the groups it supports, could take a significant hit.
That is a big ask, admittedly, and nothing we have seen to date suggests any of that is likely. But the ground has shifted – it just remains to be seen in what direction.
I am not naive; dealing with Middle East issues for 22 years – as I have, both in Ottawa and abroad – will cure anyone of that particular malady. Coming back from this will be a monumental undertaking. But Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts have emerged out of bitter conflict in the past, including after the Yom Kippur War and how the first intifada led to the Oslo Accords. Maybe that will happen again. Who knows. But what is clear is that something has to change, coming out of all this misery.