The surprising strength of Brazil’s Bolsonaro

Open this photo in gallery:

Rafael Ioris is professor of Latin American history at the University of Denver and non-resident fellow at the think tank Washington Brazil Office.

Oct. 2 was a day of great expectation in Brazil. Based on most electoral polls, it seemed that former president Lula da Silva could gain more than 50 per cent of votes and thus end the presidential election in the first round.

Though there were some reports of long lines in many precincts, the day unfolded normally and when the initial counts started coming in, most people were astounded about the fact Jair Bolsonaro, the extreme right-wing President, was ahead of Lula by a good margin.

The initial surprise quickly turned into apprehension, though many voices tried to assuage Lula’s supporters that most of the initial votes were coming from areas in the country where the incumbent candidate was expected to do well. Still, some started having a déjà vu feeling of what happened in 2016 in the U.S. when Donald Trump stunned everyone with a most unexpected victory.

In the end, Lula came ahead of Mr. Bolsonaro but by a margin much smaller than expected: 5 per cent rather than the 10 per cent predicted by most polls. So, what happened in Brazil? And what to expect from the second round taking place on Oct. 30, which is likely to determine the fate of Latin America’s largest country over the next several years, with echoes through the region, and even beyond?

Opinion: Brazil’s election could determine the fate of the Amazon rainforest

First of all, it is becoming a recurrent fact that pollsters are having a hard time predicting electoral behaviours of right-wing candidates in many parts of the world, as demonstrated not only in Brazil this month and in the U.S. in 2016, but also in the U.K. during the Brexit vote and more recently in France.

But if this seems to be a general trend, perhaps related to the fact that many feel shy to declare a vote they feel pollsters will likely see as politically incorrect or even reproachable, in Brazil there are complications that need to be understood.

For one, Mr. Bolsonaro did not provide the funds for the country to have its census counting, which was supposed to have taken place in 2020, and therefore there is no precise way for polling agencies to map out the actual composition of the country’s population, particularly in terms of the dramatic shift in religious affiliation known to have taken place in the past 10 years.

Secondly – and this seems to be particularly acute in the Brazilian case – at times under instructions of conservative religious leaders, many voters refuse to declare a vote for their extremist candidate, thus diminishing the accuracy of polls that had been potentially accurately designed.

So, though Lula may still be the favourite to win the election based on recent polls, his lead seems to be very tight. The fact is that the right-wing social shift that Mr. Bolsonaro unleashed in the past few years, which we could call Bolsonarismo, is stronger than expected. There is a good chance he may actually manage to stay in power in the nation that until not too long ago was seen as a promising democracy and rising economy in the world.

In fact, Mr. Bolsonaro nonetheless obtained more votes in the first round this time compared with what he got in 2018 – a feat for a President who mismanaged the pandemic to the point of Brazil being the second most affected nation by COVID-19, in terms of lives lost.

Most importantly, he stopped the momentum that Lula had going into the first round and proved that his fake news network on social media (WhatsApp, Instagram and YouTube), responsible for his victory in 2018, is still very effective, something that will certainly provide him with strength going into the second round.

It seems thus that Bolsonarismo has indeed become a defining feature of Brazilian politics for the time being. Many of his closest associates – such as Damares Alves, Minister of the Family, a clear extremist in socio-cultural matters, and Eduardo Pazuello, a general in the Brazilian army and the minister of health during the COVID-19 debacle – were elected with huge margins, proving the broader appeal of the President’s agenda and aggressive rhetoric.

Likewise, though some important victories on the progressive front occurred (for example, the election of Indigenous leader Sonia Guajajara), central themes of Lula’s platform, such as gender equality and environmental protection, are not as central to about half of Brazilians.

Moreover, if Mr. Bolsonaro was the alleged outsider (hence holding the appeal of novelty) four years ago, this time around he ran on a record of economic devastation for poor Brazilians, disdain for democratic institutions, militarization of public administrative positions, and, above all, a massive public-health crisis.

Rather than voting on this evidence, though, many Brazilians are voting based on cultural wedge issues, efficiently manipulated, once again, by Mr. Bolsonaro’s camp.

The fact is that in large parts of the country, Mr. Bolsonaro’s extreme conservative views on social issues, aggressive rhetoric, and authoritarian propositions (e.g. closing of the Supreme Court) are understood as much-needed solutions for complex problems many Brazilians face daily.

And even if Lula ends up winning, the deep divide that now defines Brazil will mean he will face significant challenges in government. So Mr. Bolsonaro may lose, but his impact is here to stay.