Retired general Wayne Eyre said earlier this month that Canada should keep its options open when it comes to nuclear weapons.Sean Kilpatrick/The Canadian Press
Discomfort with nuclear arms has a long history in Canada, fuelling political debates about military integration with the United States and leading to a Nobel Peace Prize for a Nova Scotia-based group opposed to these weapons.
But as U.S. security guarantees look increasingly unreliable, some are wondering whether it’s time to stop worrying and learn to love the bomb.
This debate has gained momentum after a year in which U.S. President Donald Trump ratcheted up his threats toward Canada. More recently, he seemed hell-bent on seizing Greenland, the soil of a NATO ally.
Retired general Wayne Eyre, formerly Canada’s highest-ranking soldier, said earlier this month that the country should keep its options open when it comes to nukes. He argued that “true strategic independence” was possible only with nuclear arms.
This would be the wrong approach.
There’s no doubt Canada has the technical ability to build nuclear weapons. The strong civilian nuclear industry could provide a springboard if ever Ottawa chose to go that way.
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But there would be substantial costs to doing so. Every dollar spent there cannot be spent on more useful forms of defence. There’s also a diplomatic cost. Leaving the nuclear non-proliferation treaty risks international isolation at a time when the country needs allies.
There’s a moral cost as well. Joining the nuclear club could spur an arms race among middle powers that would make the world much more dangerous. And to what end?
The first question to consider when thinking about such weapons is exactly what this capability would achieve.
For those who imagine a nuclear arsenal deterring U.S. attack, consider the evidence that having these weapons doesn’t render a country untouchable.
India and Pakistan have clashed repeatedly, both before and after each got the bomb. Israel has fought multiple wars since the country is believed to have become nuclear capable, in the 1960s. Moscow’s nuclear arsenal has not stopped Ukrainian counterattacks deep within Russia.
The most likely territorial threat to Canada is an encroachment in the Arctic. But would Ottawa really answer a foreign power meddling in the far north with nuclear strikes? The more practical way to prevent such incursions is through a robust deterrent of conventional forces. A country can buy an awful lot of military muscle for the price of building a nuclear capability from scratch.
Opinion: Keeping Canada’s options open on nuclear weapons is not as simple as it sounds
Developing a nuclear deterrent would include enriching uranium, something Canada does not currently do, and acquiring delivery systems, which usually means nuclear-powered submarines. Given that leaving the non-proliferation treaty would probably trigger widespread sanctions, much of this technology would have to be acquired or developed at a time of economic devastation.
Smaller countries can justify such immense costs only if they believe their survival is truly at stake. The father of Pakistan’s bomb, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, said that “We will eat grass, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.”
For Canada, it would be more logical to follow the model of Finland. That country hasn’t pursued nuclear weapons to counter a decades-long Russian threat. Instead, it maintains a large reserve and trains to defend its territorial integrity.
The theory of the Porcupine Defence is not that Finland could beat Russia in a head-to-head fight, but that it could make invasion “so painful and so costly that it would never be worth the attempt” – like a bear trying to eat a porcupine.
The Globe and Mail reported recently that the Canadian military had conducted modelling about how to counter a hypothetical U.S. invasion. Rapidly building up the resources needed to meet such a threat – which is still unlikely but no longer implausible – would be more useful than joining the nuclear club.
If Canada sought to join the ranks of nuclear powers it would likely face immense international pressure. Not because a nuclear-armed state as stable as Canada would itself be much of a danger. But because it would undermine the taboo against the spread of these weapons.
It’s easy to imagine such an action opening the floodgates, leading to scores of nuclear-armed countries and immense global risk. In short, getting the bomb is likely to make Canada less safe rather than more.