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Starting a war is easy, as Vladimir Putin showed on Feb. 24. But ending a war, and ending it when it has reached a point where neither side has the strength to claim total victory, is a puzzle.

The goal of the Western alliance is ending the war in Ukraine. That does not mean accepting any outcome that stops the fighting. But if and when Canada and its allies escalate in response to Moscow’s continued aggression – whether through more sanctions on Russia or more weapons transfers to Ukraine – we have to be sure that our actions aim at limiting the conflict, and bringing it to a conclusion, not expanding it.

That is why United States President Joe Biden, along with NATO and Canada, have been right to repeatedly reject Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s calls to “close the sky” over Ukraine. Imposing a no-fly zone might not provide much benefit to Ukrainians, since the bulk of the damage appears to come from Russian long-range missiles and short-range artillery. More ominously, a no-fly zone would involve NATO going directly into combat with Russia. That would be a massive escalation, and run the risk of a nuclear-armed World War III.

However, a Western alliance seeking to end the war was right to deliver weapons to Ukraine, notably thousands of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. To the extent that Ukrainians impose casualties and costs on Russia, Mr. Putin will have to scale back his war aims, and the day when he must come to the negotiating table is brought closer.

Mr. Putin’s plan for his invasion of Ukraine, his second in eight years, appears to have been simple enough. His armed forces would advance without opposition on all fronts, while special forces quickly overthrew the Kyiv government, replacing it with one amenable to being worked like a ventriloquist’s dummy. Overnight, Ukraine would become an autocratic client state – Belarus 2.0.

That was almost certainly Plan A. It came undone from the get go, thanks to Ukraine’s remarkably strong and resilient armed resistance. A speedy victory having eluded Moscow, Mr. Putin is now brutally working through Plan B. What is Plan B? That is less clear.

It may still involve the fantasy of conquering all of Ukraine. But Russia almost certainly lacks the equipment and manpower to do that. Or it may involve imposing as much human suffering and material damage as possible on Ukraine – if Mr. Putin can’t own the country, perhaps he’d rather see it wrecked.

But if Mr. Putin retains these maximalist fantasies, reality has to be intruding on them. The facts on the ground, and his own self-preservation, counsel more limited goals, such as recognition of control over only some territory, and the extraction of Ukrainian promises to stay out of the EU and NATO. The question is whether Mr. Putin is getting to the point of being willing to accept less, ideally far less, than he originally wanted. And whether the government of Mr. Zelensky can accept less, though hopefully not too much less, than his country deserves.

Brave Ukrainians upended Mr. Putin’s hopes of easy conquest. Though the Russians have made gains, especially in the south, the Ukrainian armed forces remain very much intact, and continue to impose heavy casualties on the foe, day after day.

Thanks in part to training provided by NATO before the war, and to advanced weapons systems delivered since it started, Mr. Putin’s dream of controlling all of Ukraine is almost certainly no longer achievable. The Western alliance shipped 17,000 anti-tank missiles of various types to Ukraine in late February and early March, plus a couple of thousand portable anti-aircraft missiles. The average Ukrainian infantry unit is now exceptionally well armed – better armed, for example, than Canadian infantry units.

But if Mr. Putin does not have the strength to conquer all of Ukraine – though he may yet take more territory, and surround more cities, and kill thousands – the Ukrainian military, which is still on the defensive, does not currently have the power to recapture all the land taken by Moscow’s forces.

Which is why the only logical way for this war to end is with negotiations and – as unpleasant as these will be – concessions. Ukrainians deserve a country, independent and whole. Preserving the first two of those may involve the need for compromises on the third.

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