Harry Swain is a former federal deputy minister of Industry Canada and Indian and Northern Affairs Canada
The hardest question about the F35 we are apparently about to buy isn't whether it is being bought competitively, or why it's worth $16-billion, or whether we even need it. The real question is, "Why 65 of them?"
The very military precision of the number implies that it is exactly enough to do the job. What is it that requires not 60, not 70, but exactly 65 of the most expensive aircraft we'll ever own? Of course the number will not long be 65, as the attrition of single-engine aircraft in the lonely North will be significant, so the question will become what do we need 55, or 48, or 40 super-hot fighters to do?
The embarrassing silence you hear will be because the brass hats who make these decisions decided $16-billion was the biggest number they could get away with, not the smallest number of planes we need. Of course, they all know that $16-billion won't be the final price. It never is. None of DND's big purchases — tanks for Afghanistan, search-and-rescue as well as ship-borne helicopters, supply ships for the Navy — have cost anything like the early estimates.
A wit once defined a categorilla as a category so tightly defined that it contains only one object. The official statement of requirements for the new fighter aircraft was drawn so that only one aircraft could fit. Using the statement as justification for a sole-source purchase is tautological, and expensive.
Fighters are good for shooting down other aircraft, performing ground support for infantry, flying combat air patrol (CAP) over carriers, reconnoitring an enemy's positions, and doing air shows. None of these roles seem compelling for Canada under almost any circumstances. Unmanned aircraft are better at reconnaissance and air defence, slower and more heavily armoured aircraft would be better for supporting ground operations, and flying CAP will never be a Canadian role.
Put another way, among the priorities the CAF has to choose among are a number of other purchases that seem better suited to the missions of the present and future. Buying C-17s and improved C-130s made sense: getting people and materiel to distant places is always going to be needed, whether for support of combat, peacekeeping or humanitarian missions. Medium and heavy helicopters can also serve multiple and likely purposes. Upgraded communications, light armoured vehicles and personal gear for infantry are necessary, but they are small potatoes against the monster hit proposed for the air force.
We could use not just long-range surveillance aircraft capable of operating the most sophisticated electronics available over the next forty years, but also some lighter craft — call them New Buffalos — that can operate over coastal areas where clandestine shipping, and air-sea rescue, is likely. Canada needs replacements for the aging Auroras and for the frigates (not to mention the ancient destroyers Iroquois and Algonquin, soon to be NATO's oldest, and the supply ships). And the current generation of 12-knot coastal defence vessels do not seem adequate for their jobs — no self-respecting drug smuggler would think such slow boats a challenge.
All this hardware needs to be interoperable with our allies, since Canada will likely never fight a war alone. Being part of an alliance means not having to own every imaginable capacity. We need not match the United States in carriers – or fighters. We do need to have forces sufficient to make a meaningful addition to NATO or UN capacity, but we can specialize.
Highly capable, multi-function ground troops should be the core of our multinational contribution. Before that, the primary mission is to be aware of everything that's happening near, in or over Canada. Fighters contribute to neither mission. Let's put that $16-billion to work on the right tasks.