In 1914, the Hudson’s Bay Company built a stable for its delivery horses just as Henry Ford’s assembly line was redefining transportation. Within a decade, the Bay’s horses were gone. Today, Canada risks a similar misstep. Governments are committing to new nuclear reactors at a moment when electricity systems are shifting toward renewables, storage and digitally managed grids.
For all its technical complexity, nuclear power remains a thermal, steam‑cycle technology: Uranium is mined, fabricated into fuel, used to produce heat and leaves behind spent fuel, contaminated materials and decommissioning liabilities. Wind turbines, solar panels and batteries also require materials and end‑of‑life systems; they are not magically circular. But direction is shifting toward modular, increasingly recyclable technologies that utilize renewable energy flows. Nuclear is a sophisticated expression of a 20th‑century once‑through industrial model, arriving just as the wider economy is trying to move beyond it.
Over the past decade or so, solar, wind and utility-scale batteries have seen dramatic cost declines, with solar and batteries falling by 70 to 90 per cent. These are now among the lowest-cost sources of new electricity in history. Deployment is accelerating rapidly, supported by global supply chains and continuous technological improvement. According to the International Energy Agency, annual global investment in wind, solar and storage is now more than US$700-billion – roughly 10 times annual nuclear investment.
Where nuclear construction expands, it is largely concentrated in state-directed economies where governments absorb most of the financial risk. In 2025, all 10 reactors that started construction globally were in China or Russia. Over the past decade, 94 per cent of reactors that started construction were of Chinese or Russian design.
Large reactors concentrate risk in single assets that take years to permit, finance and build. Costs remain uncertain until late in construction, and projects often face significant post-startup remediation. Canada’s most recently completed nuclear build is a cautionary example. Darlington Nuclear Generating Station in Ontario was finished after decades of CANDU experience, when domestic design and construction capability should have been near its peak.
Yet serious problems still emerged after commissioning, including cracked turbine-generator shafts, primary heat-transport vibration and fuel-sheath integrity concerns. The resulting outages and remedial work illustrate the limits of nuclear learning: With rare, complex builds, costly problems can remain hidden until after commissioning.
That is not the kind of learning curve seen in solar panels, wind turbines or batteries, where repetition tends to reveal costs before construction, not after. In the 35 years since Darlington was started up, Canada has built more than 7,500 wind turbines. We can estimate the cost and performance of the next wind turbine with far greater confidence. We know how often the turbines fail, and why. Each turbine added to the fleet creates more operating data, more supply-chain experience, more predictability of future performance.
The concept of baseload power is also changing. Modern grids do not need more inflexible supply at any price, they need dependable capacity delivered when required. Wind, solar, storage, hydro, interties, demand response and grid management now compete directly to provide that reliability – and can be deployed incrementally, faster and with less financial risk.
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As buildings electrify and winter heating peaks grow, Canada will need generating capacity that may sit idle in warmer months. That is a poor fit for capital-intensive plants whose economics depend on running flat out year-round, but less costly for renewable resources with no fuel costs and low operating expenses when some capacity is seasonally underused.
And yet, nuclear’s historical inertia carries it forward. The federal government has explicitly framed nuclear as a strategic investment priority – supporting it through financial support and tax credits. When capital costs are underwritten, tax credits provided and project risks backstopped, projects become easier to promote to mayors and chambers of commerce as a source of jobs and regional development, even when their economics are weak.
Long construction timelines make them especially lucrative for financiers: Interest during construction can account for 30 per cent or more of total project cost. Taxpayers take the risk, ratepayers inherit the cost and the system is locked into a technology increasingly misaligned with the direction of the grid. Electric prices increase unnecessarily just when low rates are needed to accelerate electrification.
The Bay’s delivery horse stable committed capital to yesterday’s system even while its replacement was overtaking it. That is the risk with new nuclear today. To keep reaching for the nuclear option is to choose the past over the future – and risks weakening Canada’s position in the emerging 21st-century economy.